Weak institutions are a natural breeding ground for organized crime and corruption. When a political system fails to perform the fundamental tasks of good governance, powerful nongovernmental entities— including military and paramilitary groups, warlords, and criminal gangs — may rise to fill the vacuum. The result is violence, corruption, and, in extreme cases, lawlessness, all of which undermine
development and stunt economic growth.
Over the past two decades, democratic transitions in Mexico and parts of Central America have tested the limits of their governing institutions. During Mexico’s continuing transition away from one-party rule — which began even before the elections of 2000 — the country has failed to overhaul the governing structures of the old regime, leaving behind weak institutions ill-equipped to handle modern, complex challenges. In a parallel trend, the nature and scale of crime have also changed. Globalization brought
an increased demand for consumer goods among the lower middle classes, which created a niche for organized-crime groups eager to facilitate those sales. Over time, these criminal groups dabbled in
other illegal markets: car heists were followed by piracy, and then by a shift to drug trafficking, which ultimately erupted in violence as competitors battled for market control. As criminal groups became more widespread, they also got more professional. Additionally, the hardening of borders after 9/11 made it
more difficult to use “informal” means to enter the United States — such as relying on corrupt border patrol and customs officers — creating a market for more sophisticated means of human smuggling.
As the challenges grew and became more complex — and noninstitutional actors multiplied and became
more powerful — the old mechanisms to control and contain crime and violence proved too primitive.
read more:
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-UnconsolidatedDemocracy.pdf
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